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S e c u r i t i e s & E xc h a n g e

Facebook, the JOBS Act,
and Abolishing IPOs
A two-tier market system would go a long way toward
promoting capital formation and curtailing speculation.
By Adam C. Pritchard

I

nitial public offerings (IPOs)—the first sale of private firms’
stock to the public—are a bellwether of investor sentiment.
Investors must be bullish if they are putting their money into
untested start-ups. IPOs are frequently cited in the business
press as a key barometer of the health of financial markets.
Politicians, too, see a steady flow of IPOs as an indicator that
capital is fueling the entrepreneurial initiative that sustains the
growth of new businesses. Growing businesses create jobs, so
Republicans and Democrats can find common ground on the
importance of promoting IPOs. That bipartisan consensus was
on display this spring as Congress passed the JOBS Act (shorthand for “Jump-start Our Business Start-ups Act”). The JOBS Act
relaxes a number of regulatory requirements viewed as stumbling
blocks for private companies considering IPOs. President Obama,
anxious in an election year to be seen as pro-growth, quickly
signed the bill into law, notwithstanding the opposition of the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
Investor sentiment can be a fickle thing, however, and the market for IPOs is notorious for its swings from peaks to valleys. That
fickleness was on display with the reaction to Facebook’s May
2012 IPO. That deal went from being the most anticipated since
Google’s IPO in 2004, to being a cautionary tale for investors.
Facebook’s offering price was $38 per share, but its stock price
quickly plunged in secondary market trading. Plaintiffs’ lawyers
promptly filed a flurry of lawsuits. An IPO drought followed as
companies were reluctant to take the plunge while investors were
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still smarting from their Facebook losses. Congress called hearings to examine the IPO process.
Is there something fundamentally wrong with IPOs, or was
Facebook an aberration?

Initial Public Offerings: Bad Deals
Unfortunately, the Facebook debacle was just a salient example
of an inefficient process. Speculation and irrational exuberance,
fueled by Wall Street marketing and media attention, grease the
wheels for deals that have little to recommend them. Unsurprisingly, the market for IPOs falls far short of the economists’
ideal of an efficient capital market.
Underpricing | Notwithstanding Facebook’s disappointing
secondary market performance, the more common problem
with IPOs is underpricing. Underpricing is the tendency for the
price of IPO stocks to rise significantly above the offering price
on the first day of secondary market trading. From the perspective of the issuer, the gap between the secondary market price
and the offering price reflects unexploited market demand for
the company’s shares—and untapped money that could help
satisfy the company’s capital needs. Why would issuers leave
this money on the table?
Although economists have put forward a variety of theories to
explain underpricing, the most plausible explanation is that the
run-up reflects a speculative frenzy among retail investors who
are excluded from the initial allocation in the offering. The role of
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speculation helps explain why traditional “book-built” offerings,
in which underwriters solicit buy orders, continue to dominate
auctions as a means of selling securities. Auctions, which are promoted as not leaving money on the table, have failed to attract a
market following. The Achilles heel of auctions is that they offer
no way of excluding the “dumb money.” If retail investors are
allowed to dominate pricing, institutional investors—wary of the
“winner’s curse” (overpaying for the shares)—will avoid the offering. Underpricing is simply the by-product of the need to exclude
the undesirables from the initial pricing process.
However, book-built offerings merely move the “dumb money”
into the secondary market. Once that happens, all bets are off.
Long-term underperformance | The influx of retail traders
into the secondary market, fueled by speculative enthusiasm,
also explains the trend of IPOs toward long-term underperformance. Investors would be better served buying an index fund
than chasing the next big thing in an IPO. Retail investors
tolerate market-lagging returns overall in exchange for the
possibility that one of their purchases may turn out to be the
next Apple or Microsoft. Secondary market prices are driven by
a lottery mentality, at least in the near term, which is not likely
to lead to accurate pricing of a company’s future cash flows.
Given the typical pattern of underpricing in IPOs, what explains
Facebook’s steep secondary market plunge? A variety of factors were
identified as the culprit, with the most straightforward being the
company’s decision to issue 25 percent more shares than originally

contemplated. That decision no doubt
played a part in the unusually large
allocation of shares to retail investors
in the offering. Morgan Stanley, Facebook’s underwriter, was faulted for its
aggressive pricing of the stock. Nasdaq, the exchange where Facebook
listed its shares, had a technological meltdown, causing a substantial
number of orders to apparently disappear into the ether on the first day
of trading. Most damning, however,
was the revelation that analysts at a
number of banks, including Morgan
Stanley, had lowered their earnings
projections for Facebook based on
difficulties the company had disclosed
with making money off of users who
accessed Facebook through mobile
devices. Analysts’ revised estimates
were shared with the banks’ institutional clients, but not with retail investors. Those lowered projections fueled
the institutional investors’ interest in
flipping their shares to retail investors
as quickly as possible after the IPO.
Speculative frenzy was not sufficient
to sustain the secondary market price in the face of that influx of
supply. The broader lesson is that the secondary market price of IPO
companies can be very unstable.
If IPOs are such bad deals, why do they persist? Under current
regulations, IPOs are a practical necessity. The raison d’être of
IPOs is that they provide an entrée to the big leagues of public
company status. That entrée is fraught with inefficiency, however,
stemming from the difficulty in correctly valuing an unknown
company making its first public disclosures in its offering prospectus. Without the benefit of a trading market to process the
disclosure and develop a consensus valuation, mispricing in the
public offering is inevitable. The bottom line is that IPOs are a
failure from the perspective of both capital formation and retail
investor protection.
So, is regulation to blame?

The Private/Public Line
Two Depression-era laws still provide the essential framework
for securities regulation in the United States. The first enacted,
the Securities Act of 1933, regulates public offerings of securities. The second, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, regulates
secondary market trading of securities, including the disclosure obligations of public companies to those markets. Despite
having been enacted only a year apart, the two statutes draw the
line between private and public in very different ways.
Under the Securities Act, public offerings are open to any and
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all comers. Accordingly, public offering regulations require not
only extensive disclosure, but limit voluntary disclosure through a
byzantine array of “gun-jumping” rules intended to curb speculative frenzies for newly issued securities. Private offerings, on the
other hand, are exempted from registration with the SEC and the
gun-jumping rules, but those offerings are restricted to investors
who can “fend for themselves” and therefore do not need the
protections afforded by registration and mandatory disclosure.
The SEC has adopted the presumption that accredited investors,
which include individuals with $200,000 in annual income or
$1 million in assets, are deemed to have the requisite investment
sophistication. Because they are limited to sophisticated investors,
private offerings are subject to considerably less onerous disclosure
requirements than public offerings. Market demands, however,
dictate that some disclosure, comparable to the SEC’s disclosure
mandates, will be forthcoming even in private offerings.
The Exchange Act has a very different public/private dividing
line. Under the Exchange Act, until recently, companies become
public when they:
listed their shares for trading on a securities exchange;
made a registered public offering; or
■■ exceeded 500 record shareholders.

■■

■■

Companies typically trigger public company status through
an initial offering of shares, with a simultaneous listing of those
shares on an exchange. Companies opted for public company
status when they needed capital in amounts that could only be
provided by the public markets, but the decision to make an IPO
frequently comes when the company is pushing the 500-shareholder limit. The problem arises because of prior private issues
to employees and early-round investors.
Notably absent from these criteria for public company status
under the Exchange Act was any consideration of the character of
the investors. Sophisticated institutions and small retail investors
were treated alike for purposes of the tally to 500. Issuers could not
avoid triggering public company status by limiting their investor
base to accredited investors. Unlike the Securities Act, which allows
companies to sell to accredited investors in private offerings, under
the Exchange Act a company had no choice but to comply with
periodic disclosure requirements once it passed 500 shareholders,
regardless of the sophistication of those investors.
This disconnect between the private/public standards under
the two securities laws causes headaches for companies making
the transition to public status, as I explain below. Facebook once
again provides the illustration.

Facebook’s Path From Private To Public
Facebook’s path from private to public company was a rocky
one. In late 2010, Goldman Sachs proposed selling a significant
block of Facebook shares to institutional and other sophisticated investors via a trust that would bundle their interests in
a single investment vehicle. The transaction drew attention
because Facebook was at that time a private company and
14
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planning to maintain that status, at least in the short term. The
bundling was an unusual feature, designed to preserve Facebook’s private status by keeping the number of record Facebook investors under 500. Goldman appeared to be exploiting
a loophole in the Exchange Act’s 500-shareholder limit.
Whether Goldman’s strategy was viable is open to debate.
The SEC’s rules allow shares held of record by a legal entity to be
counted as one person. Thus, if broker-dealers held the shares as
nominees for their customers, companies could have thousands
of beneficial owners while their record books showed a number
that remained under 500. The rule stipulates, however, that “[i]f
the issuer knows or has reason to know that the form of holding
securities of record is used primarily to circumvent” the filing
requirement, “the beneficial owners of such securities shall be
deemed to be the record owners thereof.” That proviso suggests
that the SEC would look through the legal entity to the actual
owners if the issuer knows that the entity is being used to avoid
public company filing.
The proposed transaction attracted considerable media attention, which led to the offering’s eventual demise. The deal was
pulled because of concerns that the media attention could be
deemed to be a “general solicitation,” which would cause the offer
to become “public” and require registration. Goldman instead
placed the shares in an offshore transaction.
Facebook’s interaction with the private/public divide was also
featured in another story that surfaced at around the same time.
Word leaked that the SEC was investigating secondary trading
markets for violations relating to the resale of securities issued by
private companies. Facebook was among the more notable companies traded on one of these venues, SecondMarket. These markets cater mainly to employees (both current and former) of private companies, but also some early-round investors. They have
experienced strong growth in recent years, but that growth was
threatened by the SEC’s investigation. The SEC later announced
that it had reached a settlement of an enforcement action with
SharesPost, SecondMarket’s chief rival in this sector. The agency’s
complaint in that action alleged that the trading venue had been
operating as an unlicensed broker-dealer, a regulatory violation.
The SEC’s investigation casts a shadow over the future of
private markets. In addition, these private markets, as currently
structured, face substantial limits on their trading volume. SecondMarket and similar venues do not provide the liquidity afforded
by an exchange, as they lack specialists and market makers, but
instead simply match buyers and sellers in a central (virtual) location. These trading venues are limited to accredited investors, and
the venues screen prospective investors to ensure that they qualify
as accredited. These precautions help to ensure that the shares are
not being “distributed” to the public, which could render the trading venue an underwriter for purposes of the Securities Act. The
Exchange Act’s numerical shareholder limit for private companies
also poses an obstacle to further growth of these private markets.
As a result, these trading venues are still dwarfed by the trading of
public company shares on registered exchanges. Notwithstanding
these limitations under current regulation, the growth of these
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venues suggests clear potential for expansion, if the regulatory
scheme would accommodate it.

The JOBS Act
Lawmakers in Congress seized upon the salient occasion of
Goldman’s failed private offering of Facebook shares to attack
the SEC for placing obstacles in the path of capital formation. The SEC responded in time-worn fashion, promising a
review of its regulations to assess their effect on the U.S. capital
markets. The SEC’s delaying tactic did not work, however, as a
Republican House of Representatives, anxious for an election
year edge, pushed forward with the bill that would ultimately
become the JOBS Act.
The private/public line |

How does the JOBS Act affect the
dividing line between private and public? To begin, the act makes
it easier for companies to raise capital while remaining private.
It frees up the private placement process by permitting general
solicitations, as long as sales are made only to accredited investors. The law also tinkers with the public company framework by
raising the shareholder number to 2,000 (though no more than
500 can be non-accredited) and excluding employees from the
tally. These changes should delay the point at which a growing
company would be forced to become public.
These provisions might seem like a direct shot across the
SEC’s bow, moving the line between public and private markets
so as to afford private markets more space. For the SEC, which
wraps itself in the mantle of “the investor’s advocate,” preservation of public markets—populated by a sizable contingent of
retail investors (i.e., voters)—is an existential task. The agency’s
political support is inextricably connected to its regulation of
public markets. If the public markets ceased to exist, Congress
would have little interest in funding the agency.
From another perspective, however, the JOBS Act is far from
revolutionary. Congress raised the number of investors for
triggering public company status under the Exchange Act, but
did not challenge the notion that there should be a numerical
dividing line between public and private. The JOBS Act reflects a
policy disagreement between the SEC and Congress over where
that line should be drawn, but it leaves intact the basic regulatory
architecture of the securities markets.
Promoting IPOs | Another key goal of the JOBS Act is to jumpstart the market for IPOs. The act loosens the gun-jumping
rules by authorizing issuers to “test the waters” with institutional buyers and accredited investors prior to filing a registration statement. Companies can assess whether there is demand
for the company’s shares, allowing them to avoid the expense
of registration if interest is lacking. In addition, the law frees
securities analysts to issue research reports for new issuers
during the offering process, thereby promoting demand for
the company’s shares.
The JOBS Act also encourages IPOs by easing the burden
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of accounting fees for newly public companies and reduces the
audited financial statement requirement for IPOs to only two
years. Post-IPO companies also are exempted from Section 404
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which requires auditor assessment
of a company’s internal controls, for five years. That exemption
disappears, however, after the company reaches $1 billion in
annual revenue. Nonetheless, companies that go public should
see substantially reduced auditors’ fees, at least in the short run.
Junior-varsity public companies? | For companies still unwill-

ing to face the burdens of full public company status, Congress
gave the SEC new authority to exempt offerings from the ordinary registration requirements, raising the limit for such offerings from $5 million to $50 million. Along with that exemptive
authority, Congress authorized the SEC to adopt less demanding periodic disclosure from companies using this new offering
exemption. Moreover, Congress also stipulated that the securities sold pursuant to this exemption be unrestricted, i.e., they
could be freely resold to retail investors.
This new exemption has the potential to be a game changer, creating a potential lower tier of public companies, thus blurring the
line between public and private. However, the creation of a public
company incubation pool is only a possibility, as it is easy to see the
SEC dragging its heels in implementing this exemption. Certainly
nothing will happen at the SEC anytime soon. The agency is still
struggling to get out from under a rulemaking backlog created by
the Dodd-Frank Act passed in 2010. After the 2012 election, with
the spotlight from Capitol Hill perhaps less glaring, the SEC may
feel that it has a freer hand in imposing substantial requirements
when it eventually promulgates the exemption. The SEC may
strangle the JOBS Act offering exemption in its crib.

Abolishing IPOs
The public/private dividing line is on shaky ground. With the
JOBS Act, Congress has pushed back the public line for both
the Securities Act (by eliminating the general solicitation ban
for private offerings) and the Exchange Act (by raising the
number of shareholders triggering public company status). But
the JOBS Act fails to address the fundamental inefficiency of
the market for IPOs.
In this section, I propose an alternative to IPOs—the current
transition point between private and public—that deals with that
inefficiency. The foundation of my proposal rests on two central
premises:
■■
■■

IPOs are an inefficient means of capital formation.
Private markets, if freed up to continue expanding their
pools of liquidity, can satisfy the capital needs of growing
companies until they are ready for the burdens of being a
public company.

Under my proposal, companies would go up—and down—
between the private and public markets as warranted. Any company reaching a certain quantitative benchmark would be eligible
Fall 2012
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for elevation to the public market. If a company opted for public
status, it would have to satisfy the periodic reporting obligations
of the Exchange Act for as long as it remained public. I explain
below how the process might work.

| Issuers below the quantitative benchmark would be limited in their access to both the primary and
secondary markets. Their securities could be sold in private
offerings only to accredited investors. In contrast to current
practice, however, those securities could not be freely resold
after a minimum holding period. Instead, the issuer would be
required to limit transfer of those shares to accredited investors
until it became a public company. Accredited investors could
freely resell the securities amongst themselves.
I anticipate organized markets for private trading along the
lines of SecondMarket and SharesPost. These private markets
would need the issuer’s consent for the trading of their shares, a
form of quasi-listing. Only certified accredited investors would
be allowed to participate. The private trading market would be
responsible for screening prospective investors to ensure that
they meet the SEC’s criteria. This accredited investor category
includes mutual funds, so retail investors could access exposure
to this private market, albeit only through a diversified vehicle
administered by a regulated investment manager.
The question of disclosure in the private market poses a challenging issue. It would defeat the market’s purpose to require the
disclosure expected of a public company. On the other hand, some
standardization of disclosure practices would likely benefit both
investors and issuers. And the size of today’s private offerings raises
the possibility of a collective action problem for investors, making
it difficult for them to negotiate with the issuer for contractual
representations and warranties. There are some fundamentals
hard to imagine doing without, such as audited financial statements. Beyond that baseline, however, are a range of difficult
questions regarding materiality. One possibility would be to allow
private markets to establish disclosure requirements pursuant to
their listing agreements, with those listing agreements subject to
SEC approval. Such an arrangement would afford flexibility and
responsiveness to market forces, while still giving the SEC authority to ensure that disclosure standards did not fall too far.

The private market

The public market |

Elevation to the public market would be
voluntary in my scheme. Issuers that were not prepared to
handle the burden of public company obligations could limit
the transfer of their shares to the private market. If a company
felt that it could satisfy its capital needs in the private market,
it would be free to remain there.
Companies would graduate to the public market based on the
value of their common equity. One possible benchmark would
be $75 million in market capitalization, a threshold currently
used by the SEC for streamlined “shelf” registration. A company
electing to move to the public market would initiate the process
by filing a Form 10-K (annual report) with the SEC. Its shares
would then continue to trade in the private market for a season-
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ing period with the filing of requisite 10-Qs (quarterly reports).
The prices in the private market would now be informed by full
SEC-mandated disclosure. After the seasoning period, accredited
investors would be able to sell their shares in the public market.
This opportunity would be available whether the accredited
investor had purchased their shares from the company or from
other accredited investors in the private trading market. That
public market could be an exchange if the company chose to list,
or the over-the-counter market. Either way, the trading price in
the public market would be informed by the prior trading in the
private market, as well as the new information released in the
company’s 10-K and 10-Qs.
There are some questions concerning the private market seasoning period before public trading would be permitted. It would
not be practicable to limit companies from any sales during the
seasoning period; capital needs do not go away simply because the
company is making the transition to public status. Indeed, the need
for capital is presumably pushing the company to bear the burdens
of public status. This creates the risk that companies could use
investment banks or other intermediaries, such as hedge funds,
as conduits during the seasoning period. This strategy is limited,
however, by the fact that the intermediaries could only sell the
shares to other accredited investors during the seasoning period,
thereby limiting the chance that the shares would be dumped on
retail investors. Moreover, unless the company has very pressing
capital needs, it is unlikely to accept much of a liquidity discount
for its shares, which it will be able to freely sell after the seasoning
period expires. It might be necessary, however, to impose volume
limits on sellers in the public markets during a post-seasoning
transition period to allow the trading market to develop. A quick
dump of shares immediately after the seasoning period expired
has the potential to reproduce the inefficient pricing and irrational
speculation that taints the current market for IPOs.
Only after the company graduated to having its shares traded
in the public secondary market would the company be allowed
to sell securities to public investors. What form should sales of
public equity by the issuer take? The logic of my proposal, with
its preference for the superior informational efficiency of trading
markets, suggests that issuers selling equity should be limited to
at-the-market (ATM) offerings. Issuers would sell directly into
the public trading market instead of relying on an underwriter to
identify (create?) demand. This approach puts its faith in markets,
rather than salesmen, for efficient pricing.
Unfortunately, this strategy has its limits. ATM offerings
are a rapidly growing portion of seasoned equity offerings, but
their volume is still dwarfed by traditional book-built offerings.
Particularly for larger offerings, the liquidity of the secondary
trading market may be insufficient to absorb the newly issued
shares. Indeed, even book-built offerings would be substantially
constrained by the existence of a market price. Could we nudge
issuers toward ATM offerings without mandating them?
One possibility would be to eliminate the Securities Act’s strict
liability standards for ATM offerings, while retaining it for underwritten offerings. At a minimum, it makes little sense to impose
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underwriter liability on the broker-dealers hired by issuers to
manage ATM offerings. If large volumes need to be “sold, not
bought,” the opportunities for abuse come in the selling process,
and ATM offerings are not “sold.” The SEC’s enforcement efforts
would be needed to ensure that there were no backdoor selling
efforts to prime the market for an ATM offering. Even for the
issuer, the draconian threat of the Securities Act’s strict liability
seems excessive for an ATM offering. ATM offerings—if genuinely
issued into a pre-existing market without solicitation—do not
really require a registration statement or a prospectus; at most
they need to file an 8-K with the SEC announcing the number
of shares to be offered, followed by another 8-K disclosing the
number actually sold. Anti-fraud concerns could be addressed
by the Exchange Act’s less draconian Rule 10b-5.
Relegation | If there are private companies wanting to rise to
the public level, it follows that there will be public companies
anxious to shed the burdens of public status. An important
benefit of a two-tier market is that retail investors would not
be cut off completely from liquidity if a company chooses
to relegate itself to the private market. There is no reason to
preclude retail investors from selling their shares in the private
market, even if they would be barred from purchasing shares
in companies that dropped to private status. Moreover, there
is little to be gained by prohibiting companies from exiting
the public pool; a restrictive approach will simply discourage
companies from pursuing public company status in the first
place. On the other hand, too easy an exit may invite abuses.
To check manipulative schemes, I would mandate a shareholder vote with the usual required disclosures before a company
would be permitted to drop from public to private status. A vote
would not trap companies that have struggled after going public,
but it would require the company to persuade its shareholders
that the benefits of public company status were no longer worth
the candle.
Objections | Would an expanded private market open the door
to fraud and manipulation? The short answer is that as long
as people are infected by the love of money, fraud will always
be with us. Given that sad fact of human nature, we should
funnel transactions to the venues that make it most difficult
to get away with fraud, and trading markets provide a critical
check against fraud. To be sure, the private market proposed
here is likely to have a higher incidence of fraud and manipulation than the public market. But the scope of that fraud will
necessarily be limited by the smaller size of the private markets
relative to their public counterparts. Moreover, the entities
sponsoring trading in those private markets will have competitive incentives to take cost-effective measures to discourage
fraud; discouraging fraud will encourage investor participation.
SEC enforcement would remain available to counter the most
egregious abuses.
The potential for abuse in the private market has to be weighed
against reductions in fraud elsewhere. In particular, my seasoning
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period requirement substantially reduces the opportunities for
fraud by companies entering the public market. On balance, the
overall incidence of fraud may be less. And retail investors, who
are least able to bear it, will almost certainly be exposed to less
fraud. At the same time, capital formation—efficient allocation
of capital to cost-justified projects—will be enhanced.

Conclusion
The conspicuous flaws with IPOs suggest that we should put an
end to them, if we can establish a viable alternative. In my view,
restrictions on private markets have hindered that viable alternative from emerging until now. In particular, private markets
such as SecondMarket and SharesPost have been hamstrung
by the 500-shareholder limit triggering public company status.
The JOBS Act’s increase to 2,000 shareholders for public company status promises to bolster the liquidity of private markets,
making them a robust alternative for growing companies.
This newly available liquidity is the lynchpin of my argument
that we should replace IPOs with a two-tier market system. Issuers choosing to make the transition to the public market would
be required to file periodic disclosures with the SEC for an
appropriate seasoning period, which would replace the IPO as
the rite of passage to becoming a public company. Only after the
seasoning period would the issuer be allowed to sell shares to the
public at large. Such a regime would allow the secondary market
to process an aspiring public company’s disclosure prior to any
sales to the public and allow investors to arrive at a well-informed
consensus valuation. This regulatory framework would go a long
way toward promoting efficient capital formation and curtailing
speculation. A happy by-product would be more vigorous investor protection for unsophisticated investors. Does anyone think
that retail investors would be harmed if we eliminated IPOs?
With the passage of the JOBS Act, change is coming to
the demarcation between private and public status under the
securities laws. Will the SEC attempt to obstruct this change, or
embrace it in an effort to promote greater capital formation?
My proposal affords the SEC an opportunity to promote capital
formation while also enhancing investor protection. The two-tier
private/public market scheme outlined here would harness private markets to promote the public good while simultaneously
eliminating the public bad of initial public offerings.
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